Word sand things we do
Smart things to say are often nothing more than illusions invented for the purpose of not loosing face to ones self before others. It is a very simple mechanism; you pass on the buck of missing the point to the other person. For instance, the more complicated your phrasing becomes the more pressure is put on the other person to come forward with an acute interpretation of what you just said in order to continue talking. Why do people tend to obscure their words when the stakes are high? Especially when it is our feelings and deepest meanings that are at stake? There are many possible explanations. One of the most sensible ones and mystic too, is that one cannot, ever, name what rests at the core of one’s self. In other words, that which is so profound and sacred which is unnamable and is also the source of our most recognizable passions prevents deep engagement with it and thus pushes people to hide behind complicated words what in more simple terms could be phrased with an equivalent word of ‘fear’, ‘joy’, ‘anger’ or ‘love’. True, all of these phrases could be, by virtue of being named, mere proxies of what is actually meant. Nevertheless, they convey a meaning that is graspable, at least for the common man or woman for who these words enhance a series of possible actions and reactions that absent those names would be impossible to execute or at least perform without due reference to such meanings.
Meaning, a common one, is what the random, subjective, and arbitrary organization of language rejects. In assigning multiple possible interpretations to a word, the speaker attempts to remain uncommitted; there is no need to relate any of his\her words to any possibility in the world. It is true, language is polyphonic the same sentence can convey a myriad of possibilities to a multitude of readers and listeners, however, all of these possibilities are only actual through experience, a common one; there is no private language as such. Poets and others are ludicrous in claiming some form of subjectivity that relieves them from the commitment they avoid in shadows and silences. What about the effects of words? Has a poet ever worried about the suicidal delirium that a verse might generate in the eye of the reader? Does it matter at all that he\she, the poet, considers this possibility? At a glimpse, a poet will immediately reject this possibility; it is not the task of a poet, there are psychologists and other forms of dealing with the anxiety produced by the vertigo of multiple meanings aligned in fragmented and delirious ways in an obviously damaged psyche. We might for an instance agree with poets here, since language can convey multiple meanings one ought to deal with the polyphonic character of language and poetry with his or her own tools. Poets do not kill any one, they only put forward several good reasons slaughter oneself or others. True, all of this is just on the condition than one is intuitively damaged to search death in the words of a book; continuously seeks for signs that convey the meanings they for so long have been unable to name.
While poets are not responsible for any death they are a good example of the possibility exalting subjectivity at the expense of the effects of such act on the minds and lives of others. Now, lets turn to those that are not poets. Those common people that, not theoretically, but in practice and no further justification, nor beauty or structure, not resignification or transformation, attempt to systematically erode language by ciphering their scripts in veils of representation that might attempt not to explain anything but reveal a willingness to avoid otherness. Buck passing signification is common these days. This is represented in the practice of ‘telling something to someone which I do mean, but nevertheless relieves me from the responsibility to act in accordance’. An example might suffice: take for example promises. We are inclined to think that promises are by their very nature the most powerful commitment that language can carry. Nevertheless, a promise is always condition upon the discursive setting of its enunciation. A standard promise in a marriage situation, for example, is the promise of being ‘faithful’. Nonetheless, there are myriad discursive settings where faithfulness can acquire distinct significations. First, at the macro level there is the societal, macro cultural setting and meaning of faithfulness: which might vary in responsibility and character depending on gender issues and expected practices for the marrying couple. As such, some might imagine that in some cultures, being faithful could translate in the indictment of ‘not having sexual intercourse with other partners’. While in other cultures sexual intercourse with other partners might be the norm and faithfulness could be understood as providing for the formation and consolidation of familial life, independent of extramarital conditions. At a second level, the level of the family and close networks of the marrying couple, the promise to be faithful might represent the extended compromise of fulfilling social duties related to marriage, such as being present at important events and also respecting social hierarchies and roles among the close network of familial and friendship ties. It will also mean to keep performing the expected tasks associated to the relationship from these close networks. Nonetheless, we can already see that the promise is context bound, promising is an act of assigning social meaning to something that will occur or is occurring, it is the exercise of speaking the parameters to the ones one will be held accountable. The promise to be faithful is so context bound that it cannot be detached from the social structures that condition its enunciations. Furthermore, even for the couple the exercise of promising is a task that requires expectation about each other and knowledge of their circumstances that will make them ascribe a particular meaning to the act of promising to be faithful. Here we might find replications of the macro levels, where social expectations inform the marrying couple of the limits and fondness of their commitments.
In a society were extramarital relationships are the norm for the male, it could be very simply understood that in promising faithfulness, the male is accepting to support the female, both materially and emotionally, assuming that extramarital relationships are not to be discarded and ought to be treated not as a breach of the promise. In other words it is supposed that women and men come to an understanding of the social limits of their promising given certain accepted practices. On the other hand, lets talk about the possibility that a couple has a rather strong sense of being independent of the world around them, and that they actually have common grounds to understand the promise in a more, or less, comprehensive way. This is that they have actually been able to define in their own terms what they mean by faithfulness. In any event, even at this micro level, agreement or common understanding is required, reasons must be uttered to understand ‘faithfulness’ in one or another way. Avoiding the issue will soon translate either into passive reproduction of macro discursive practices or the inevitable crushing of language into bits and pieces of misunderstandings.
These are the poets that one ought to be aware of, the unconscious ones. Those that perform compelling speech acts in trying to actualize rituals they seldom understand. Beware, that this is not an argument for avoiding promises, but an incitation to make explicit the content of such speech acts. The fact that promises are context bound and their limits are set by the discursive practices that enable them, one ought to be very careful in not taking for grated what is meant by: ‘I promise that I will…..’ If a promise, comes ever as a smart thing to say, on must wonder why I is it that it is smart. Which purpose does it serve? I would propound here, instead to understanding and taking stupid speech acts, those seemingly inappropriate or not conducting anywhere at face value and possibly assign them a higher hierarchy than promises, for in not fulfilling any particular purpose, they convey meanings that might at some point help understand the deep understandings of other people, understanding their promises, and grieves, their needs and intentions. Stupid things said are always a clear example of what people are sometimes to do in order not to lose themselves in the perplexities of acting as if words were powerful, but understanding that they in fact are. In fact this understanding is what provides stupidity with power, in that it doesn’t promise in search of commitment but speaks in search of building an understanding of such commitment. A promise might be a smart thing to do for it might be set in a social realm where such promise will carry benefits. A promise with very many conditional claims, might on the other hand, look stupid and not a promise at all, but ascertaining the limits of one’s own words could never be of less value than just taking promises at face value as if they were unselfish commitments. Of course, we promise because it is good for us, not because it is good for the other. That is why in the search for common ground stupid things must be said in order to avoid the temptation of not recognizing the selfishness of our words and at least try to build a setting where selfishness is reciprocal.
Meaning, a common one, is what the random, subjective, and arbitrary organization of language rejects. In assigning multiple possible interpretations to a word, the speaker attempts to remain uncommitted; there is no need to relate any of his\her words to any possibility in the world. It is true, language is polyphonic the same sentence can convey a myriad of possibilities to a multitude of readers and listeners, however, all of these possibilities are only actual through experience, a common one; there is no private language as such. Poets and others are ludicrous in claiming some form of subjectivity that relieves them from the commitment they avoid in shadows and silences. What about the effects of words? Has a poet ever worried about the suicidal delirium that a verse might generate in the eye of the reader? Does it matter at all that he\she, the poet, considers this possibility? At a glimpse, a poet will immediately reject this possibility; it is not the task of a poet, there are psychologists and other forms of dealing with the anxiety produced by the vertigo of multiple meanings aligned in fragmented and delirious ways in an obviously damaged psyche. We might for an instance agree with poets here, since language can convey multiple meanings one ought to deal with the polyphonic character of language and poetry with his or her own tools. Poets do not kill any one, they only put forward several good reasons slaughter oneself or others. True, all of this is just on the condition than one is intuitively damaged to search death in the words of a book; continuously seeks for signs that convey the meanings they for so long have been unable to name.
While poets are not responsible for any death they are a good example of the possibility exalting subjectivity at the expense of the effects of such act on the minds and lives of others. Now, lets turn to those that are not poets. Those common people that, not theoretically, but in practice and no further justification, nor beauty or structure, not resignification or transformation, attempt to systematically erode language by ciphering their scripts in veils of representation that might attempt not to explain anything but reveal a willingness to avoid otherness. Buck passing signification is common these days. This is represented in the practice of ‘telling something to someone which I do mean, but nevertheless relieves me from the responsibility to act in accordance’. An example might suffice: take for example promises. We are inclined to think that promises are by their very nature the most powerful commitment that language can carry. Nevertheless, a promise is always condition upon the discursive setting of its enunciation. A standard promise in a marriage situation, for example, is the promise of being ‘faithful’. Nonetheless, there are myriad discursive settings where faithfulness can acquire distinct significations. First, at the macro level there is the societal, macro cultural setting and meaning of faithfulness: which might vary in responsibility and character depending on gender issues and expected practices for the marrying couple. As such, some might imagine that in some cultures, being faithful could translate in the indictment of ‘not having sexual intercourse with other partners’. While in other cultures sexual intercourse with other partners might be the norm and faithfulness could be understood as providing for the formation and consolidation of familial life, independent of extramarital conditions. At a second level, the level of the family and close networks of the marrying couple, the promise to be faithful might represent the extended compromise of fulfilling social duties related to marriage, such as being present at important events and also respecting social hierarchies and roles among the close network of familial and friendship ties. It will also mean to keep performing the expected tasks associated to the relationship from these close networks. Nonetheless, we can already see that the promise is context bound, promising is an act of assigning social meaning to something that will occur or is occurring, it is the exercise of speaking the parameters to the ones one will be held accountable. The promise to be faithful is so context bound that it cannot be detached from the social structures that condition its enunciations. Furthermore, even for the couple the exercise of promising is a task that requires expectation about each other and knowledge of their circumstances that will make them ascribe a particular meaning to the act of promising to be faithful. Here we might find replications of the macro levels, where social expectations inform the marrying couple of the limits and fondness of their commitments.
In a society were extramarital relationships are the norm for the male, it could be very simply understood that in promising faithfulness, the male is accepting to support the female, both materially and emotionally, assuming that extramarital relationships are not to be discarded and ought to be treated not as a breach of the promise. In other words it is supposed that women and men come to an understanding of the social limits of their promising given certain accepted practices. On the other hand, lets talk about the possibility that a couple has a rather strong sense of being independent of the world around them, and that they actually have common grounds to understand the promise in a more, or less, comprehensive way. This is that they have actually been able to define in their own terms what they mean by faithfulness. In any event, even at this micro level, agreement or common understanding is required, reasons must be uttered to understand ‘faithfulness’ in one or another way. Avoiding the issue will soon translate either into passive reproduction of macro discursive practices or the inevitable crushing of language into bits and pieces of misunderstandings.
These are the poets that one ought to be aware of, the unconscious ones. Those that perform compelling speech acts in trying to actualize rituals they seldom understand. Beware, that this is not an argument for avoiding promises, but an incitation to make explicit the content of such speech acts. The fact that promises are context bound and their limits are set by the discursive practices that enable them, one ought to be very careful in not taking for grated what is meant by: ‘I promise that I will…..’ If a promise, comes ever as a smart thing to say, on must wonder why I is it that it is smart. Which purpose does it serve? I would propound here, instead to understanding and taking stupid speech acts, those seemingly inappropriate or not conducting anywhere at face value and possibly assign them a higher hierarchy than promises, for in not fulfilling any particular purpose, they convey meanings that might at some point help understand the deep understandings of other people, understanding their promises, and grieves, their needs and intentions. Stupid things said are always a clear example of what people are sometimes to do in order not to lose themselves in the perplexities of acting as if words were powerful, but understanding that they in fact are. In fact this understanding is what provides stupidity with power, in that it doesn’t promise in search of commitment but speaks in search of building an understanding of such commitment. A promise might be a smart thing to do for it might be set in a social realm where such promise will carry benefits. A promise with very many conditional claims, might on the other hand, look stupid and not a promise at all, but ascertaining the limits of one’s own words could never be of less value than just taking promises at face value as if they were unselfish commitments. Of course, we promise because it is good for us, not because it is good for the other. That is why in the search for common ground stupid things must be said in order to avoid the temptation of not recognizing the selfishness of our words and at least try to build a setting where selfishness is reciprocal.
posted by Considerando extraños sucesos... at
12:41 PM
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